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Quantum key distribution promises unconditionally secure communications. However, as practical
devices tend to deviate from their specifications, the security of some practical systems is no longer
valid. In particular, an adversary can exploit imperfect detectors to learn a large part of the secret
key, even though the security proof claims otherwise. Recently, a practical approach—measurement-
device-independent quantum key distribution—has been proposed to solve this problem. However,
so far its security has only been fully proven under the assumption that the legitimate users of
the system have unlimited resources. Here we fill this gap and provide a rigorous security proof
against general attacks in the finite-key regime. This is obtained by applying large deviation theory,
specifically the Chernoff bound, to perform parameter estimation. For the first time we demonstrate
the feasibility of long-distance implementations of measurement-device-independent quantum key
distribution within a reasonable time-frame of signal transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is unequivocal that quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] needs to bridge the gap between theory and practice.
In theory, QKD offers perfect security. In practice, however, it does not, as most practical devices behave differently
from the theoretical models assumed in the security proofs. As a result, we face implementation loopholes, or so-called
side-channels, which may be used by adversaries without being detected, as seen in recent attacks against certain
commercial QKD systems [3–11].
There are two potential ways to guarantee security in the realisations of QKD. The first is to develop mathematical
models that perfectly match the behaviour of physical apparatuses, and then incorporate this information into a new
security proof. While this is plausible in theory, unfortunately it is very hard to realise in practice, if not impossible.
The second alternative is to design new protocols and develop security proof techniques that are compatible with
a wide class of device imperfections. This allows us to omit an accurate characterisation of real apparatuses. The
most well-known example of such a solution is (full) device-independent QKD (diQKD) [12–16]. Here, the legitimate
users of the system (typically called Alice and Bob) treat their devices as two quasi “black boxes”, i.e., they need
to know which elements their boxes contain, but not how they fully function [17]. The security of diQKD relies on
the violation of a Bell inequality [18, 19], which certifies the presence of quantum correlations. Despite its beauty,
however, this approach is highly impractical because it requires a loophole-free Bell test which at the moment is still
unavailable [20]. Also, its secret key rate at practical distances is very limited [21, 22].
Very recently, a novel approach has been introduced, which is fully practical and feasible to implement. This scheme
is known as measurement-device-independent QKD (mdiQKD) [23] and offers a clear avenue to bridge the gap between
theory and practice. Its feasibility has been promptly demonstrated both in laboratories and via field-tests [24–28].
It successfully removes all (existing and yet to be discovered) detector side-channels [3, 5, 6, 9–11], which, arguably,
is the most critical part of most QKD implementations. Importantly, in contrast to diQKD this solution does not
require that Alice and Bob perform a loophole-free Bell test; it is enough if they prove the presence of entanglement
in a quantum state that is effectively distributed between them, just like in standard QKD schemes [29]. In addition,
now Alice and Bob may treat the measurement apparatus as a true “black box”, which may be fully controlled by
the adversary. A slight drawback is that Alice and Bob need to characterise the quantum states [e.g., the polarisation
degrees of freedom of phase-randomised weak coherent pulses (WCPs)] that they send through the channel. But, as
this process can be verified in a protected environment outside the influence of the adversary, it is less likely to be a
problem. For completeness, the readers can refer to [30] where a characterisation of the prepared states is no longer
required.
Nevertheless, so far the security of mdiQKD has only been proven in the asymptotic regime [23], which assumes that
Alice and Bob have access to an unlimited amount of resources, or in the finite regime but only against particular types
of attacks [31, 32]. In summary, until now, a rigorous security proof of mdiQKD that takes full account of the finite
size effects [33–35] has appeared to be missing and, for this reason, the feasibility of long-distance implementations of
mdiQKD within a reasonable time-frame of signal transmission has remained undemonstrated.
2The main contributions of this work are twofold. First, in contrast to existing heuristic results on mdiQKD, we
provide, for the first time, a security proof in the finite-key regime that is valid against general attacks, and satisfies
the composability definition [36, 37] of QKD. Second, we apply large deviation theory, specifically a multiplicative
form of the Chernoff bound [38], to perform the parameter estimation step. The latter is crucial to demonstrate that a
long-distance implementation of mdiQKD (e.g., 150 km of optical fiber with 0.2 dB/km) is feasible within a reasonable
time-frame. To obtain high secret key rates in this scenario, it is common to use decoy state techniques [39–41], both
for standard QKD protocols and mdiQKD. Here a key challenge is to estimate the transmittance and the quantum
bit error rate (QBER) of the single-photon component of the signal at the presence of high losses (e.g., 30 dB). We
show that such an estimation problem can be solved using the Chernoff bound, as it provides good bounds for the
parameters above even in the high-loss regime. We highlight that our results can be applied to other QKD protocols
(e.g., the standard decoy state BB84 protocol [39–41]) as well as to general experiments in quantum information.
II. SECURITY DEFINITION
Prior to stating the protocol, let us quickly review the security framework [36, 37] that we are considering here. A
general QKD protocol (executed by Alice and Bob) generates either a pair of bit strings SA and SB, or a symbol ⊥ to
indicate the abort of the protocol. In general, the string of Alice, SA, can be quantum mechanically correlated with
a quantum state that is held by the adversary. Mathematically, this situation is described by the classical-quantum
state
ρAE =
∑
s
|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρsE,
where {|s〉}s denotes an orthonormal basis for Alice’s system, and the subscript E indicates the system of the adversary.
Ideally, we say that a QKD protocol is secure if it satisfies two conditions, namely the correctness and the secrecy.
The correctness condition is met if SA = SB, i.e., Alice’s and Bob’s bit strings are identical. The secrecy condition
is met if ρAE = UA ⊗ ρE, where UA =
∑
s
1
|S| |s〉〈s| is the uniform mixture of all possible values of the bit string SA.
That is, the system of the adversary is completely decoupled from that of Alice.
Owing to the presence of errors, however, these two conditions can never be perfectly met. For example, in the
finite-key regime it is impossible to guarantee SA = SB with certainty. In practice, this implies that we need to
allow for some minuscule errors. That is, we say that a QKD scheme is ǫcor-correct if Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ ǫcor, i.e.,
the probability that Alice’s and Bob’s bit strings are not identical is not greater than ǫcor. Similarly, we say that a
protocol is ǫsec-secret if
1
2
‖ρAE − UA ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫsec,
where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the trace norm. That is, the state ρAE is ǫsec-close to the ideal situation described by UA ⊗ ρE.
Thereby a QKD protocol is said to be ǫ-secure if it is both ǫcor-correct and ǫsec-secret, with ǫcor + ǫsec ≤ ǫ.
With this security definition we are able to guarantee that the security of the protocol holds even when combined
with other protocols, i.e., the protocol is secure in the so-called universally composable framework [36, 37].
III. PROTOCOL DEFINITION
The setup is illustrated in Fig. 1. Alice and Bob use a laser source to generate quantum signals that are diagonal in
the Fock basis. Instances of such sources include attenuated laser diodes emitting phase-randomised WCPs, triggered
spontaneous parametric down-conversion sources, and practical single-photon sources. Each pulse is prepared in a
different BB84 state [42], which is selected, for example, uniformly at random from two mutually unbiased bases,
denoted as Z and X. The signals are then sent to an untrusted relay Charles, who is supposed to perform a Bell
state measurement that projects them into a Bell state. Also, Alice and Bob apply decoy state techniques [39–41]
to estimate the gain (i.e., the probability that the relay outputs a successful result) and the QBER for various input
photon-numbers.
Next, Charles announces whether or not his measurements are successful, including the Bell states obtained. Alice
and Bob keep the data that correspond to these instances and discard the rest. Also, they post-select the events
where they employ the same basis. Finally, either Alice or Bob flips part of her/his bits to correctly correlate them
with those of the other. See Table I for a detailed description of the different steps of the protocol.
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FIG. 1: A schematic diagram of mdiQKD. Alice and Bob prepare quantum signals in different BB84 polarisation states [42]
with a polarisation modulator (Pol-M). Also, they use an intensity modulator (Decoy-IM) to generate decoy states. The signals
are sent to an untrusted relay Charles, who is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement that projects the incoming signals
into a Bell state. See the main text for details.
1. State Preparation Alice and Bob repeat the first four steps of the protocol for i = 1, . . . , N till the conditions in the
Sifting step are met. For each i, Alice chooses an intensity a ∈ {as, ad1 , . . . , adn}, a basis α ∈ {Z,X}, and a random
bit r ∈ {0, 1} with probability pa,α/2. Here as (adj ) is the intensity of the signal (decoy) states. Next, she generates a
quantum signal (e.g., a phase-randomised WCP) of intensity a prepared in the basis state of α given by r. Likewise, Bob
does the same.
2. Distribution Alice and Bob send their states to Charles via the quantum channel.
3. Measurement If Charles is honest, he measures the signals received with a Bell state measurement. In any case, he informs
Alice and Bob (via a public channel) of whether or not his measurement was successful. If successful, he reveals the Bell
state obtained.
4. Sifting If Charles reports a successful result, Alice and Bob broadcast (via an authenticated channel) their intensity and
basis settings. For each Bell state k, we define two groups of sets: Za,bk and X a,bk . The first (second) one identifies signals
where Charles declared the Bell state k and Alice and Bob selected the intensities a and b and the basis Z (X). The
protocol repeats these steps until |Za,bk | ≥ Na,bk and |X a,bk | ≥Ma,bk ∀a, b, k. Next, say Bob flips part of his bits to correctly
correlate them with those of Alice (see Table II). Afterwards, they execute the last steps of the protocol for each k.
5. Parameter Estimation Alice and Bob use nk random bits from Zas,bsk to form the code bit strings Zk and Z′k, respectively.
The remaining Rk bits from Zas,bsk are used to compute the error rate Eas,bsk = 1Rk
∑
l
rl ⊕ r′l, where r′l are Bob’s bits. If
Eas,bsk > Etol, Alice and Bob assign an empty string to Sk and abort steps 6 and 7 for this k. The protocol only aborts if
Eas,bsk > Etol ∀k. If Eas,bsk ≤ Etol, Alice and Bob use Za,bk and X a,bk to estimate nk,0, nk,1 and ek,1. The parameter nk,0
(nk,1) is a lower bound for the number of bits in Zk where Alice (Alice and Bob) sent a vacuum (single-photon) state.
ek,1 is an upper bound for the single-photon phase error rate. If ek,1 > etol, an empty string is assigned to Sk and steps
6 and 7 are aborted for this k, and the protocol only aborts if ek,1 > etol ∀k.
6. Error Correction For those k that passed the parameters estimation step, Bob obtains an estimate Zˆk of Zk using an
information reconciliation scheme. For this, Alice sends him leakEC,k bits of error correction data. Next, Alice computes
a hash of Zk of length ⌈log2(4/ǫcor)⌉ using a random universal2 hash function, which she sends to Bob together with the
hash [36]. If hash(Zˆk) 6= hash(Zk), Alice and Bob assign an empty string to Sk and abort step 7 for this k. The protocol
only aborts if hash(Zˆk) 6= hash(Zk) ∀k.
7. Privacy Amplification If k passed the error correction step, Alice and Bob apply a random universal2 hash function to
Zk and Zˆk to extract two shorter strings of length ℓk [36]. Alice obtains Sk and Bob Sˆk. The concatenation of Sk (Sˆk)
form the secret key SA (SB).
TABLE I: Protocol Definition.
Since Charles’ measurement is basically used to post-select entanglement between Alice and Bob, the security of
mdiQKD can be proven by using the idea of time reversal. Indeed, mdiQKD builds on the earlier proposals of time-
reversed EPR protocols by Biham et al. [43] and Inamori [44], and combine them with the decoy state technique.
The end result is the best of both worlds—high performance and high security. We note on passing that the idea
of time reversal has also been previously used in other quantum information protocols including one-way quantum
computation.
4Bell state reported by Charles
Alice & Bob |ψ−〉 |ψ+〉 |φ−〉 |φ+〉
Z basis Bit flip Bit flip - -
X basis Bit flip - Bit flip -
TABLE II: Post-processing of data in the sifting step. To guarantee that their bit strings are correctly correlated, say Bob
applies a bit flip to part of his data, depending on the Bell state reported by Charles and the basis setting selected.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now present one main result of our paper. It states that the protocol introduced above is both ǫcor-correct and
ǫsec-secret, given that the length ℓ of the secret key SA is selected appropriately for a given set of observed values.
See Table I for the definition of the different parameters that we consider in this section.
The correctness of the protocol is guaranteed by its error correction step, where, for each possible Bell state k,
Alice sends a hash of Zk to Bob, who compares it with the hash of Zˆk. If both hash values are equal, the protocol
gives Sk = Sˆk except with error probability ǫcor/4. If hash(Zˆk) 6= hash(Zk), it outputs the empty string (i.e., the
protocol is trivially correct). Moreover, if the protocol aborts, the result is ⊥, i.e., it is also correct. This guarantees
that SA = SB except with error probability less or equal than ǫcor. Alternatively to this method, Alice and Bob may
also guarantee the correctness of the protocol by exploiting properties of the error correcting code employed [45].
If the length ℓk of each bit string Sk, which forms the secret key SA, satisfies
ℓk ≤ nk,0 + nk,1 [1− h (ek,1)]− leakEC,k − log2
8
ǫcor
− 2 log2
2
ε′kεˆk
− 2 log2
1
2εk,PA
, (1)
the protocol is ǫsec-secret, with ǫsec =
∑
k ǫk,sec and ǫk,sec = 2(ε
′
k + 2εk,e + εˆk) + εk,b + εk,0 + εk,1 + εk,PA. In
Eq. (1), h(x) = −x log2 (x) − (1 − x) log2 (1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy, and the parameters εk,0, εk,1,
and εk,e quantify, respectively, the probability that the estimation of the terms nk,0, nk,1 and ek,1 is incorrect.
A sketch of the proof of Eq. (1) can be found in Appendix A. There it is also explained the meaning of all the
epsilons contained in the term ǫk,sec, which we omit here for simplicity. In the asymptotic limit of very large data
blocks, the terms reducing the length of SA due to statistical fluctuations may be neglected, and thus ℓ satisfies
ℓ ≤ ∑kmax {nk,0 + nk,1 [1− h (ek,1)]− leakEC,k, 0}, as previously obtained in [23]. That is, nk,0 and nk,1 provide a
positive contribution to the secret key rate, while nk,1h (ek,1) and leakEC,k reduce it. The term nk,1h (ek,1) corresponds
to the information removed from Zk in the privacy amplification step of the protocol, while leakEC,k is the information
revealed by Alice in the error correction step.
The second main contribution of this work is an estimation method to obtain the relevant parameters nk,0, nk,1 and
ek,1 needed to evaluate the key rate formula above, when Alice and Bob send Charles a finite number N of signals
and use a finite number of decoy states. We solve this problem using techniques in large deviation theory. More
specifically, we employ the Chernoff bound [38]. It is important to note that standard techniques such as Azuma’s
inequality [46] do not give very good bounds here. This is because this result does not consider the properties of the a
priori distribution. Therefore, it is far from optimal for situations such as high loss or a highly bias coin flip, which are
relevant in long-distance QKD. In contrast, the Chernoff bound takes advantage of the property of the distribution
and provides good bounds even in a high-loss regime.
More precisely, we show that the estimation of nk,0, nk,1 and ek,1 can be formulated as a linear program, which
can be solved efficiently in polynomial time and gives the exact optimum even for large dimensions [47]. Importantly,
this general method is valid for any finite number of decoy states used by Alice and Bob, and for any photon-
number distribution of their signals. Also, for the typical scenario where Alice and Bob send phase-randomised WCPs
together with two decoy states each, we solve analytically the linear program, and obtain analytical expressions for
the parameters above, which can be used directly in an experiment. A sketch of the estimation method is given in
Appendix B. For a detailed analysis of both estimation techniques we refer to the Appendices C and D.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section we analyse the behaviour of the secret key rate provided in Eq. (1). In our simulation, we consider
that Alice and Bob encode their bits in the polarisation degrees of freedom of phase-randomised WCPs. Also, we
assume that Charles uses the linear optics quantum relay illustrated in Fig. 2, which is able to identify two of the
four Bell states. With this setup, a successful Bell state measurement corresponds to the observation of precisely two
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FIG. 2: A schematic diagram of Charles’ measurement device. The signals from Alice and Bob interfere at a 50 : 50 beam
splitter (BS), which has on each end a polarising beam splitter (PBS) that projects the incoming photons into either horizontal
(H) or vertical (V ) polarisation states. A click in the single-photon detectors D1H and D2V , or in D1V and D2H , indicates
a projection into the Bell state |ψ−〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉 − |V H〉), while a click in D1H and D1V , or in D2H and D2V , implies a
projection into the Bell state |ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉+ |V H〉).
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FIG. 3: Expected key rate as function of the distance. Secret key rate ℓ/N in logarithmic scale for the protocol introduced in
section III with phase-randomised WCPs as a function of the distance. The solid lines correspond to different values for the
total number of signals N sent by Alice and Bob. The overall misalignment in the channel is 1.5%, and the security bound
ǫ = 10−10. For simulation purposes we consider the following experimental parameters [48]: the loss coefficient of the channel
is 0.2 dB/km, the detection efficiency of the relay is 14.5%, and the background count rate is 6.02 × 10−6. Our results show
clearly that even with a realistic finite size of data, say N = 1012 to 1014, it is possible to achieve secure mdiQKD at long
distances. In comparison, the dotted line represents a lower bound on the secret key rate for the asymptotic case where Alice
and Bob send Charles infinite signals and use an infinite number of decoy settings.
detectors (associated to orthogonal polarisations) being triggered. Note, however, that the results presented in this
paper can be applied to other types of coding schemes like, for instance, phase or time-bin coding [1, 2], and to any
quantum operation that Charles may perform, as they solely depend on the measurement results that he announces.
We use experimental parameters from [48]. But, whereas [48] considers a free-space channel, we assume a fiber-based
channel with a loss of 0.2 dB/km. The detection efficiency of the relay (i.e., the transmittance of its optical components
together with the efficiency of its detectors) is 14.5%, and the background count rate is 6.02×10−6. Moreover, we use
a rather generic channel model that includes an intrinsic error rate which simulates the misalignment and instability
of the optical system. This is done by placing a unitary rotation in both input arms of the 50 : 50 beam splitter, and
another unitary rotation in one of its output arms [49]. In addition, we fix the security bound to ǫ = 10−10.
The results are shown in Figs. 3-4 for the situation where Alice and Bob use two decoy states each. In this
scenario, we obtain the parameters nk,0, nk,1 and ek,1 using the analytical estimation procedure introduced above
(see Appendix C for more details). The first figure illustrates the secret key rate (per pulse) ℓ/N as a function of
the distance between Alice and Bob for different values of the total number of signals N sent. We fix ǫcor = 10
−15;
this corresponds to a realistic hash tag size in practice [36]. Also, we fix the intensity of the weakest decoy states to
ad2 = bd2 = 5×10−4, since, in practice, is difficult to generate a vacuum state due to imperfect extinction. This value
for ad2 and bd2 can be easily achieved with a standard intensity modulator. Moreover, for simplicity, we assume an
error correction leakage that is a fixed fraction of the sifted key length nk, i.e., leakEC,k = nkζh(E
as,bs
k ), with ζ = 1.16
and where h(·) is again the binary Shannon entropy [33]. In a realistic scenario, however, the value of ζ typically
depends on the value of nk, and when nk < 10
5 the parameter ζ may be bigger than 1.16. For a given distance,
we optimise numerically ℓ/N over all the free parameters of the protocol. This includes the intensities as, ad1 , bs and
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FIG. 4: Expected key rate as function of the block size. The plot shows the secret key rate ℓ/N in logarithmic scale as a
function of the total number of signals N sent by Alice and Bob in the limit of zero distance. The security bound ǫ = 10−10.
The solid lines correspond to different values for the intrinsic error rate due to the misalignment and instability of the optical
system. The horizontal dotted lines show the asymptotic rates. The experimental parameters are the ones described in the
caption of Fig. 3. Our results show that, even for a finite size of signals sent by Alice and Bob, mdiQKD is robust to intrinsic
errors due to basis misalignment and instability of the optical system.
bd1 , the probability distributions pa,α and pb,β in the state preparation step, the parameters N
a,b
k and M
a,b
k in the
sifting step, the term nk in the parameter estimation step, and the different epsilons contained in ǫsec. Our simulation
result shows clearly that mdiQKD is feasible with current technology and does not require high efficiency detectors
for its implementation. If Alice and Bob use laser diodes operating at 1 GHz repetition rate, and each of them sends
N = 1013 signals, we find, for instance, that they can distribute a 1 Mb secret key over a 75 km fiber link in less than
3 hours. This scenario corresponds to the red line shown in Fig. 3. Notice that, at telecom wavelengths, standard
InGaAs detectors have modest detection efficiency of about 15%. Since mdiQKD requires two-fold coincidence rather
than single-detection events, as is the case in the standard decoy state protocol, the key rate of mdiQKD is lower
than that of the standard decoy state scheme. However, with high-efficiency detectors such as silicon detectors [50] in
800nm or high-efficiency SSPDs [51], the key rate of mdiQKD can be made comparable to that of the standard decoy
state protocol.
The second figure illustrates ℓ/N as a function of N for different values of the misalignment in the limit of zero
distance. For comparison, this figure also includes the asymptotic secret key rate when Alice and Bob send an infinite
number of signals and use an infinite number of decoy states [23]. Our results show that significant secret key rates
are already possible with 1011 signals, given that the error rate is not too large.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proved the security of mdiQKD in the finite-key regime against general attacks. This is the only known fully
practical QKD protocol that offers an avenue to bridge the gap between theory and practice in QKD implementations.
Importantly, our results clearly demonstrate that even with practical signals [e.g., phase-randomised weak coherent
pulses (WCPs)] and a finite size of data (say 1012 to 1014 signals) it is possible to perform secure mdiQKD over long
distances (up to about 150 km).
To achieve high secret key rates in such high-loss regime, it is typical both for standard QKD schemes and mdiQKD
to use decoy state techniques. A main challenge in this scenario is to obtain tight bounds for the gain and quantum
bit error rate (QBER) of the single-photon components sent by Alice and Bob. We have shown that this estimation
problem can be successfully solved using techniques in large deviation theory, more precisely, the Chernoff bound. This
result takes advantage of the property of the distribution, and thus provides good bounds for the relevant parameters
even in the presence of high losses, as is the case in QKD realisations.
Using the Chernoff bound we have rewritten the problem of estimating the gain and QBER of the single-photon
signals as a linear program, which can be solved efficiently in polynomial time. This general method is valid for any
finite number of decoy states, and for any photon-number distribution of the signals. It can be used, for instance,
with laser diodes emitting phase-randomised WCPs, triggered spontaneous parametric down-conversion sources, and
practical single-photon sources. Also, for the common scenario where Alice and Bob send phase-randomised WCPs
together with two decoy states each, we have obtained tight analytical bounds for the quantities above. These results
apply to different types of coding schemes like, for example, polarisation, phase or time-bin coding.
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Appendix A: Secrecy
Here, we briefly discuss on the secrecy of the protocol described in Table I. To begin with, note that Alice and Bob
obtain the error rate Eas,bsk using a random sample of Zas,bsk of size Rk. This means that when Eas,bsk satisfies the
tolerated value Etol, the error rate between the strings Zk and Z
′
k, which we denote as ξ
as,bs
k , satisfies the following
inequality written as conditional probability [52]
Pr
[
ξas,bsk ≥ Eas,bsk + χ(nk, Rk, ε¯k)|Ωpass
]
≤ ε¯2k, (A1)
where χ(x, y, z) =
√
(y + x)(y + 1)/(xy2) ln z−1. Here, the parameter Ωpass represents the event that all the tests
performed during the realisation of the protocol satisfy the tolerated values.
Let E′k denote the adversary’s information about Zk up to the error correction step in Table I. By using a privacy
amplification scheme based on two-universal hashing [36] we can generate an ǫk-secret string Sk of length ℓk, where
εk > 0, and
ǫk ≤ 8εk + 2−
1
2
(
H
4εk
min(Zk|E′k)−ℓk
)
−1
. (A2)
The function H4εkmin (Zk|E′k) denotes the smooth min-entropy [36, 53]. It quantifies the average probability that the
adversary guesses Zk correctly using the optimal strategy with access to E
′
k.
The term E′k can be decomposed as E
′
k = CkEk, where Ck is the information revealed by Alice and Bob during
the error correction step, and Ek is the adversary’s information prior to that step. Using a chain-rule for smooth
entropies [36], we obtain
H4εkmin (Zk|E′k) ≥ H4εkmin (Zk|Ek)− |Ck|, (A3)
with |Ck| ≤ leakEC,k + log2(8/ǫcor).
The bits of Zk can be distributed among three different strings: Z
0
k , Z
1
k and Z
rest
k . The first contains bits where
Alice sent a vacuum state, the second where both Alice and Bob sent a single-photon state, and Zrestk includes the
rest of bits. Using a result from [54], we have that
H4εkmin (Zk|Ek) ≥ Hε
′
k+2ε
′′
k+(εˆk+2εˆ
′
k+εˆ
′′
k )
min
(
Z0kZ
1
kZ
rest
k |Ek
) ≥ nk,0 +Hε′′kmin (Z1k|Z0kZrestk Ek)− 2 log2 2ε′kεˆk , (A4)
where 4εk = ε
′
k+2ε
′′
k+(εˆk+2εˆ
′
k+ εˆ
′′
k). Here, we have used the fact that H
εˆ′k
min
(
Zrestk |Z0kEk
) ≥ 0, and H εˆ′′kmin (Z0k |Ek) ≥
H0min
(
Z0k |Ek
)
= Hmin
(
Z0k
)
= nk,0. The latter arises because vacuum states contain no information about their bit
values, which are uniformly distributed.
The next step is to obtain a lower bound for the term H
ε′′k
min
(
Z1k |Z0kZrestk Ek
)
. Taking that Alice and Bob do the
state preparation scheme perfectly in the Z and X bases (i.e., they prepare perfect BB84 states), we can re-write
this quantity in terms of the smooth max-entropy between them, which is directly bounded by the strength of their
correlations [33]. More precisely, the entropic uncertainty relation gives us
H
ε′′k
min
(
Z1k |Z0kZrestk Ek
) ≥ nk,1 −Hε′′kmax (X1k |X ′k1) ≥ nk,1 − nk,1h (ek,1) . (A5)
8Combining Eqs. (A2,A3,A4,A5), we find that a secret key of length ℓk given by Eq. (1) gives an error of ǫk ≤
2(ε′k + 2ε
′′
k + εˆk + 2εˆ
′
k + εˆ
′′
k) + εk,PA. Finally, after composing the errors related with the estimation of nk,0, nk,1 and
ek,1, selecting εˆ
′
k and εˆ
′′
k equal to zero, and also removing the conditioning on Ωpass, we obtain a security parameter
ǫk,sec given by
ǫk,sec = 2(ε
′
k + 2εk,e + εˆk) + εk,b + εk,0 + εk,1 + εk,PA, (A6)
where εk,b = ε¯k
√
Pr[Ωpass], and εk,0, εk,1 and εk,e denote, respectively, the error probability in the estimation of nk,0,
nk,1 and ek,1.
Appendix B: Sketch of the parameter estimation method
To simplify the discussion, let us consider the estimation of the parameter nk,0. The method to obtain nk,1 and
ek,1 follows similar arguments. The procedure can be divided into two steps. First, we calculate a lower bound for the
number of indexes in Zas,bsk where Alice sent a vacuum state. This quantity is denoted as mk,0. Second, we compute
nk,0 from mk,0 using the Serfling inequality for random sampling without replacement [52].
In the first step we use a multiplicative form of the Chernoff bound [38] for independent random variables, which
does not require the prior knowledge on the population mean. More precisely, we use the following Claim.
Claim 1: Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn, be a set of independent Bernoulli random variables that satisfy Pr(Xi = 1) = pi, and
let X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ = E[X ] =
∑n
i=1 pi, where E[·] denotes the mean value. Let x be the observed outcome of X
for a given trial (i.e., x ∈ N+) and µL = x−
√
n/2 ln (1/ǫ) for certain ǫ > 0. When (2ε−1)1/µL ≤ exp [3/(4√2)]2 and
(εˆ−1)1/µL < exp (1/3) for certain ε, εˆ > 0, we have that x satisfies
x = µ+ δ, (B1)
except with error probability γ = ǫ + ε+ εˆ, where the parameter δ ∈ [−∆, ∆ˆ], with ∆ = g(x, ε4/16), ∆ˆ = g(x, εˆ3/2)
and g(x, y) =
√
2x ln (y−1). Here ε (εˆ) denotes the probability that x < µ−∆ (x > µ+ ∆ˆ).
Importantly, the bounds (−∆ and ∆ˆ) on the fluctuation parameter δ that appears in Eq. (B1) do not depend on
the mean value µ. A proof of Claim 1 can be found in Appendix E. There, we introduce as well a generalised version
of Claim 1 for the cases where (2ε−1)1/µL > exp
[
3/(4
√
2)
]2
and/or (εˆ−1)1/µL ≥ exp (1/3).
In order to apply this statement and be able to obtain the parameter mk,0, we rephrase the protocol described in
section III as follows. For each signal, we consider that Alice (Bob) first chooses a photon-number n (m) and sends
the signal to Charles, who declares whether his measurement is successful or not. After, Alice decides the intensity
setting a, and Bob does the same. This virtual protocol is equivalent to the original one because the essence of decoy
state QKD is precisely that Alice and Bob could have postponed the choice of which states are signals or decoys after
Charles’ declaration of the successful events. This is possible because Alice’s and Bob’s observables commute with
those of Charles. Note that for each specific combination of values n and m, the observables that Alice and Bob use
to determine whether a state is a signal or a decoy act on entirely different physical systems from those of Charles.
This implies that Alice and Bob are free to postpone their measurement and thus their choice of signals and decoys.
Also, this result shows that for each combination n and m, the signal and decoy states provide a random sample of
the population of all signals containing n and m photons respectively. Therefore, one can apply random sampling
theory in classical statistics to the quantum problem.
Let Sk,nm denote the set that identifies those signals sent by Alice and Bob with n and m photons respectively,
when they select the Z basis and Charles announces the Bell state k. And, let |Sk,nm| = Sk,nm, and pa,b|nm,Z be the
conditional probability that Alice and Bob have selected the intensity settings a and b, given that their signals contain,
respectively, n and m photons prepared in the Z basis. Then, if we apply the above equivalence, independently of each
other and for each signal Alice and Bob assign to each element in Sk,nm the intensity setting a, b, with probability
pa,b|nm,Z.
Let Xa,bi|k,nm be 1 if the ith element of Sk,nm is assigned to the intensity setting combination a, b, and otherwise 0.
And, let
Xa,bk =
∑
n,m
Sk,nm∑
i=1
Xa,bi|k,nm, (B2)
with µa,bk = E[X
a,b
k ] =
∑
n,m pa,b|nm,ZSk,nm. Let x
a,b
k = |Za,bk | denote the observed outcome of the random variable
9Xa,bk for a given trial. Then, if (2ε
−1
a,b)
1/µa,b
k,L ≤ exp [3/(4√2)]2 and (εˆ−1a,b)1/µa,bk,L < exp (1/3), with
µa,bk,L = |Za,bk | −
√∑
a,b
|Za,bk |/2 ln (1/ǫa,b), (B3)
the Claim above implies that
|Za,bk | =
∑
n,m
pa,b|nm,ZSk,nm + δa,b, (B4)
except with error probability γa,b = ǫa,b + εa,b + εˆa,b, where δa,b ∈ [−∆a,b, ∆ˆa,b], with ∆a,b = g(|Za,bk |, ε4a,b/16) and
∆ˆa,b = g(|Za,bk |, εˆ3/2a,b ).
Using similar arguments, we find that the parameter mk,0 can be written as
mk,0 =
∑
m
pas,bs|0m,ZSk,0m −∆0, (B5)
except with error probability ε0, where ∆0 = g(
∑
m pas,bs|0m,ZSk,0m, ε0).
Now, it is easy to find a lower bound for mk,0. One only needs to minimise Eq. (B5) given the linear constraints
imposed by Eq. (B4) for all a, b. This problem can be solved either using numerical tools as linear programming [47]
or, for some particular cases, also analytical techniques. See the Appendices C and D for details.
The second step of the procedure is quite direct. Note that Alice forms her bit string Zk using nk random indexes
from Zas,bsk . Using [52] we obtain
nk,0 = max
{⌊
nk
mk,0
|Zas,bsk |
− nkΛ(|Zas,bsk |, nk, ε′′k,0)
⌋
, 0
}
, (B6)
except with error probability
εk,0 ≤ ε′k,0 + ε′′k,0, (B7)
where ε′k,0 corresponds to the total error probability in the estimation of mk,0, and the function Λ(x, y, z) is defined
as Λ(x, y, z) =
√
(x− y + 1) ln (z−1)/(2xy).
Appendix C: Analytical estimation of nk,0, nk,1 and ek,1
This Appendix contains a general method to obtain an analytical expression for nk,0, nk,1 and ek,1, when Alice and
Bob use two decoy states each and the photon-number distribution of their signals is Poissonian.
That is, here we assume that a ∈ A = {as, ad1 , ad2}, with as > ad1 > ad2 , b ∈ B = {bs, bd1, bd2}, with bs > bd1 > bd2 ,
and the probability that Alice (Bob) sends an n-photon (m-photon) signal when she (he) selects the intensity a (b) is
given by pn|a = e−aan/n! (pm|b = e−bbm/m!).
A similar estimation procedure has been recently introduced in [55]. Note, however, that [55] considers one of the
two decoy signals a vacuum state, which is very hard to guarantee in practical QKD implementations, due to the
finite extinction ratio of the intensity modulator [56]. Also, [55] analyses the asymptotic regime where Alice and Bob
send an arbitrarily large number of signals. Below we introduce a general analytical method that overcomes both
difficulties.
We begin by introducing some notations. Let Sk,nm denote the number of signals sent by Alice and Bob with n and
m photons respectively, when they select the basis Z and Charles declares the Bell state k. As noted in Appendix B,
for each combination of values n and m, the signal and decoy states provide a random sample of the population of all
signals containing n and m photons respectively. Therefore, standard large deviation theory techniques such as the
Chernoff bound apply [34]. In particular, when both
(
2ε−1a,b
)1/µa,b
k,L ≤ e[3/(4
√
2)]
2
,
(
εˆ−1a,b
)1/µa,b
k,L
< e1/3, (C1)
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with the parameter µa,bk,L given by
µa,bk,L = |Za,bk | −
√∑
a,b
|Za,bk |/2 ln (1/ǫa,b), (C2)
we have that |Za,bk | can be written as
|Za,bk | =
∑
n,m
pa,b|nm,ZSk,nm + δa,b, (C3)
except with error probability γa,b = ǫa,b + εa,b + εˆa,b, where εa,b refers to the failure probability of one side, whereas
εˆa,b refers to that of the other side. The total failure probability is thus the sum and is denoted by γa,b. The parameter
δa,b ∈ [−∆a,b, ∆ˆa,b], with ∆a,b = g(|Za,bk |, ε4a,b/16) and ∆ˆa,b = g(|Za,bk |, εˆ3/2a,b ), and the function g(x, y) =
√
2x ln (y−1).
A proof of Eq. (C3) can be found in Appendix B (see also Appendix E), where we introduce as well a generalised
version of it for the cases where Eq. (C1) is not satisfied.
1. Estimation of nk,0
The procedure to obtain nk,0 can be decomposed into two steps. First, we calculate a lower bound for the number
of indexes in Zas,bsk where Alice sent a vacuum state. This quantity is denoted as mk,0, and can be written as
mk,0 =
∑
m
pas,bs|0m,ZSk,0m −∆0, (C4)
except with error probability ε0, where ∆0 = g(
∑
m pas,bs|0m,ZSk,0m, ε0). The proof of Eq. (C4) follows similar lines
as the proof of Eq. (C3) [34]. Second, we use the Serfling inequality for random sampling without replacement [49] to
compute nk,0 from mk,0.
Let us begin with the first step. According to Eq. (C4), to compute mk,0 we need to search for a lower bound for∑
m
pas,bs|0m,ZSk,0m. (C5)
The probability pa,b|nm,Z can be written as
pa,b|nm,Z =
pn|apm|bpa,b,Z∑
a,b pn|apm|bpa,b,Z
, (C6)
where pa,b,Z denotes the probability that Alice and Bob send signals in the Z basis with intensity a and b respectively.
Using the fact that pn|a = e−aan/n! and pm|b = e−bbm/m! we obtain
pa,b|nm,Z =
1
n!m!τnm
e−(a+b)anbmpa,b,Z, (C7)
with the term τnm given by
τnm =
1
n!m!
∑
a,b
e−(a+b)anbmpa,b,Z. (C8)
Hence, we have that Eq. (C5) can be expressed as
pas,bs,Ze
−(as+bs)Tk,0m, (C9)
with the parameter Tk,0m given by
Tk,0m =
∑
m
bms
m!
S˜k,0m, (C10)
where S˜k,nm = Sk,nm/τnm. In so doing, we reduce the problem of finding mk,0 to that of calculating a lower bound
for Tk,0m. This is what we do next.
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Our starting point is Eq. (C3), which now can be rewritten as
|Z˜a,bk | =
∑
n,m
anbm
n!m!
S˜k,nm + δ˜a,b, (C11)
with |Z˜a,bk | = ea+b|Za,bk |/pa,b,Z and δ˜a,b = ea+bδa,b/pa,b,Z. Next, we combine the quantities given by Eq. (C11) in such
a way that we can cancel out the terms of the form S˜k,1m. For this, we define the parameter Lk,a0,a1 as
Lk,a0,a1 = a0|Z˜a1,bsk | − a1|Z˜a0,bsk | = (a0 − a1)Tk,0m +
∑
m=0
n≥2
a0a
n
1 − a1an0
n!m!
bms S˜k,nm + a0δ˜a1,bs − a1δ˜a0,bs , (C12)
with a0, a1 ∈ A. Note that when a0 > a1 the second term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (C12) is always less or equal to zero.
This means, in particular, that Lk,a0,a1 ≤ (a0− a1)Tk,0m+ a0Γˆa1,bs + a1Γa0,bs . Here, for the fluctuation terms δ˜a,b, we
have used the fact that they lay in the interval [−Γa,b, Γˆa,b], with Γa,b = ea+b∆a,b/pa,b,Z and Γˆa,b = ea+b∆ˆa,b/pa,b,Z,
except with error probability γa,b.
As a result we find, therefore, that
Tk,0m ≥ max
a0,a1∈A
a0>a1
{
Lk,a0,a1 − a0Γˆa1,bs − a1Γa0,bs
a0 − a1 , 0
}
, (C13)
except with error probability
∑
a γa,bs .
Moving to the second step, we use the Serfling inequality [49] to compute nk,0 from mk,0. This is so because Alice
forms her bit string Zk using nk random indexes from Zas,bsk . We obtain
nk,0 = max
{⌊
nk
mk,0
|Zas,bsk |
− nkΛ(|Zas,bsk |, nk, ε′′k,0)
⌋
, 0
}
, (C14)
except with error probability
εk,0 ≤ ε′k,0 + ε′′k,0, (C15)
where the function Λ(x, y, z) is defined as Λ(x, y, z) =
√
(x− y + 1) ln (z−1)/(2xy), and ε′k,0 ≤ ε0 +
∑
a γa,bs .
2. Estimation of nk,1
To estimate nk,1 we employ the same two-step method that we used to obtain nk,0. That is, we first compute a
lower bound for the number of indexes in Zas,bsk where both Alice and Bob sent a single-photon. We shall denote this
quantity as mk,1, which can be written as
mk,1 = pas,bs|11,ZSk,11 −∆1, (C16)
except with error probability ε1, where the parameter ∆1 = g(pas,bs|11,ZSk,11, ε1). Again, this statement can be
proven with similar arguments to those used to prove Eq. (C3). Second, we calculate nk,1 frommk,1 using the Serfling
inequality [49].
According to Eq. (C16), to compute mk,1 we need to search for a lower bound for Sk,11. This is what we do next.
Our starting point is Eq. (C11). The estimation method is then divided into two steps. First, we cancel the terms
S˜k,0m and S˜k,n0 using Gaussian elimination. Second, we cancel either the parameter S˜k,12 or S˜k,21, depending on the
combination of intensities that are used in the first step; this will become clear below.
Let us begin with the first step. For this, we introduce a vector of intensities v = [a0, a1, b0, b1] that satisfies a0 > a1
and b0 > b1, with ai ∈ A and bi ∈ B. Then, we find that the parameters Gk,v defined below do not contain any term
of the form S˜k,0m or S˜k,n0, with
Gk,v = |Z˜a0,b0k |+ |Z˜a1,b1k | − |Z˜a0,b1k | − |Z˜a1,b0k |. (C17)
Next, we move to the second step. Here, we select another vector v′ = [a′0, a
′
1, b
′
0, b
′
1] that fulfils the same conditions
as v, and, moreover, satisfies the following constraints: ai = a
′
j , ai⊕1 > a
′
j⊕1, bi′ = b
′
j′ and bi′⊕1 > b
′
j′⊕1 for certain
i, j, i′, j′ = 0, 1, and where the symbol ⊕ denotes the modulo-2 addition. Then, we need to consider two cases.
12
Case 1: If (a0 + a1)/(a
′
0 + a
′
1) > (b0 + b1)/(b
′
0 + b
′
1), we define the parameter Jk,v,v′ as
Jk,v,v′ = (b
2
0 − b21)(a0 − a1)Gk,v′ − (b′20 − b′21 )(a′0 − a′1)Gk,v . (C18)
Using Eqs. (C11)-(C17), we can rewrite Jk,v,v′ as
Jk,v,v′ =
∞∑
n,m=1
cnm
n!m!
S˜k,nm + δk,v,v′ , (C19)
where the coefficients cnm and δk,v,v′ are given by
cnm = (b
2
0 − b21)(a0 − a1)(a′n0 − a′n1 )(b′m0 − b′m1 )− (b′20 − b′21 )(a′0 − a′1)(an0 − an1 )(bm0 − bm1 ), (C20)
δk,v,v′ = (b
2
0 − b21)(a0 − a1)δk,v′ − (b′20 − b′21 )(a′0 − a′1)δk,v,
and the parameters δvk and δ
v′
k have the form
δvk = δ˜a0,b0 + δ˜a1,b1 − δ˜a0,b1 − δ˜a1,b0 ,
δv
′
k = δ˜a′0,b′0 + δ˜a′1,b′1 − δ˜a′0,b′1 − δ˜a′1,b′0 . (C21)
From the conditions above, it is easy to show that c11 ≥ 0 and cnm ≤ 0 when n+m ≥ 3. For simplicity, however,
we de not include such proofs here. Combining these results with Eq. (C19), we obtain
S˜k,11 ≥ 1
c11
(Jk,v,v′ − δk,v,v′ ) . (C22)
Now, we need to compute an upper bound for δk,v,v′ . Using the fact that δ˜a,b ∈ [−Γa,b, Γˆa,b] except with error
probability γa,b, we obtain that δk,v,v′ ≤ Γk,v,v′ with
Γk,v,v′ = (b
2
0 − b21)(a0 − a1)(Γˆa′0,b′0 + Γˆa′1,b′1 + Γˆa′0,b′1 + Γˆa′1,b′0) + (b′20 − b′21 )(a′0 − a′1)(Γa0,b0 + Γa1,b1
+ Γa0,b1 + Γa1,b0). (C23)
We find, therefore, that
Sk,11 ≥ sk,V = max
v,v′∈V
τ11
c11
(Jk,v,v′ − Γk,v,v′ ) , (C24)
expect with error probability ∑
a,b
γa,b, (C25)
where V denotes the set of pairs of vectors v, v′, which satisfy the conditions required in Case 1.
Case 2: If (a0 + a1)/(a
′
0 + a
′
1) ≤ (b0 + b1)/(b′0 + b′1), we define the parameter Jk,v,v′ as
Jk,v,v′ = (a
2
0 − a21)(b0 − b1)Gv
′
k − (a′20 − a′21 )(b′0 − b′1)Gvk, (C26)
and we proceed as in Case 1. We obtain
Sk,11 ≥ sk,V′ = max
v,v′∈V′
τ11
c11
(Jk,v,v′ − Γk,v,v′) , (C27)
expect with error probability given by Eq. (C25), where V ′ contains vectors v, v′, which satisfy the conditions required
in Case 2. Now, the coefficient c11 = (a0 − a1)(b0 − b1)(a′0 − a′1)(b′0 − b′1)(a0 + a1 − a′0 − a′1), and
Γk,v,v′ = (a
2
0 − a21)(b0 − b1)(Γˆa′0,b′0 + Γˆa′1,b′1 + Γˆa′0,b′1 + Γˆa′1,b′0) + (a′20 − a′21 )(b′0 − b′1)(Γa0,b0 + Γa1,b1
+ Γa0,b1 + Γa1,b0). (C28)
As a result, we obtain that Sk,11 is lower bounded by
Sk,11 ≥ max {sk,V , sk,V′ , 0} , (C29)
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except with error probability given by Eq. (C25).
Finally, we use the Serfling inequality [49] and find that
nk,1 = max
{⌊
nk
mk,1
|Zas,bsk |
− nkΛ(|Zas,bsk |, nk, ε′′k,1)
⌋
, 0
}
, (C30)
except with error probability [57]
εk,1 ≤ ε′k,1 + ε′′k,1, (C31)
where ǫ′k,1 ≤ ε1 +
∑
a,b γa,b.
3. Estimation of ek,1
The procedure to estimate ek,1 can be decomposed into three steps. First, we calculate a lower bound for the
number of signals where Alice and Bob send a single-photon state prepared in the basis X, and where Charles declares
the Bell state k. We will denote this quantity as n¯k,1. Second, we obtain an upper bound for the total number of
errors in these signals. We shall denote this parameter as e¯k,1. And, third, we use the Serfling result [49] to compute
ek,1 from nk,1, n¯k,1 and e¯k,1.
Suppose that we already completed the first two steps and we obtained n¯k,1 and e¯k,1. Then, the number of signals
where Alice and Bob send a single-photon state, and Charles declares the Bell state k, is lower bounded by nk,1+ n¯k,1,
with nk,1 given by Eq. (C30). Now, since these single-photon signals (when averaged over Alice’s and Bob’s key bit
values) are basis independent, the Serfling inequality tells us that
ek,1 = min
{⌈
nk,1
(
e¯k,1
n¯k,1
)
+ (nk,1 + n¯k,1)Υ(nk,1, n¯k,1, ε
′′′
k,e)
⌉
, nk,1
}
, (C32)
except with error probability
εk,e ≤ ε′k,e + ε′′k,e + ε′′′k,e, (C33)
where the function Υ(x, y, y) is defined as Υ(x, y, z) =
√
(x+ 1) ln (z−1)/(2y(x+ y)).
Next, we calculate n¯k,1 and e¯k,1, together with their associated error probabilities ε
′
k,e and ε
′′
k,e. To obtain n¯k,1 we
use the same strategy presented in Appendix C 2 to calculate a lower bound for Sk,11. We only need to replace the
basis Z with the basis X in all the mathematical expressions that appear in that Appendix. Thereby we find that n¯k,1
has a similar expression to that given by Eq. (C29), except with error probability ε′k,e ≤
∑
a,b γa,b.
Below we obtain e¯k,1. For this, we need, however, to introduce a new group of index sets, whose elements we
will denote by Ea,bk . These sets identify signals where Charles declared the Bell state k, Alice and Bob selected the
intensity settings a and b and the basis X, and, after applying the bit flip operation in the sifting step of the protocol,
their bits differ. That is, {Ea,bk }a,b points to errors in the basis X.
Also, let Ek,nm denote the number of signals sent by Alice and Bob with n and m photons respectively, when they
select the basis X, Charles declares the Bell state k, and, after applying the bit flip operation in the sifting step,
Alice’s and Bob’s bits differ. That is, e¯k,1 represents an upper bound for Ek,11.
Our starting point is the size of the sets Ea,bk , i.e.,
|Ea,bk | =
∑
n,m
pa,b|nm,XEk,nm + δa,b. (C34)
This equation can be rewritten as
|E˜a,bk | =
∑
n,m
anbm
n!m!
E˜k,nm + δ˜a,b, (C35)
where |E˜a,bk | = ea+b|Ea,bk |/pa,b,X, E˜k,nm = Ek,nm/τnm with τnm having the form of Eq. (C8) but with pa,b,X instead of
pa,b,Z, and δ˜a,b = e
a+bδa,b/pa,b,X.
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Next, we follow a similar procedure to that used in Appendix C 2. Now, however, we try to cancel out only the
terms E˜k,0m and E˜k,n0. For this, we introduce a vector v = [a0, a1, b0, b1] that satisfies a0 > a1 and b0 > b1, with
ai ∈ A and bi ∈ B, and we define the parameters Fk,v as
Fk,v = |E˜a0,b0k |+ |E˜a1,b1k | − |E˜a0,b1k | − |E˜a1,b0k | = (a0 − a1)(b0 − b1)E˜k,11 + δvk
+
∞∑
n,m=1
(n,m) 6=(1,1)
(an0 − an1 )(bm0 − bm1 )
n!m!
E˜k,nm, (C36)
where δvk = δ˜a0,b0 + δ˜a1,b1 − δ˜a0,b1 − δ˜a1,b0 . The third term on the r.h.s of Eq. (C36) is always greater or equal than
zero. This means, in particular, that Fk,v is lower bounded by
Fk,v ≥ (a0 − a1)(b0 − b1)E˜k,11 + δvk. (C37)
Now, we need to compute a lower bound for δvk. We have that each parameter δ˜a,b ∈ [−Γa,b, Γˆa,b], with
Γa,b = e
a+b∆a,b/pa,b,X, Γˆa,b = e
a+b∆ˆa,b/pa,b,X, ∆a,b = g(|Ea,bk |, ε4a,b/16) and ∆ˆa,b = g(|Ea,bk |, εˆ3/2a,b ), except with
error probability γa,b = ǫa,b + εa,b + εˆa,b. We obtain, therefore, that
δvk ≥ Γk,v = −Γa0,b0 − Γa1,b1 − Γˆa0,b1 − Γˆa1,b0 . (C38)
Finally, if we combine Eqs. (C37)-(C38), we find that Ek,11 is upper bounded by
Ek,11 ≤ min
v
(Fk,v − Γk,v)τ11
(a0 − a1)(b0 − b1) = e¯k,1, (C39)
except with error probability ε′′k,e ≤
∑
a,b γa,b.
Appendix D: Numerical estimation of nk,0, nk,1 and ek,1
In this Appendix we present a numerical method to calculate nk,0, nk,1 and ek,1 that is valid for any number
of decoy states used by Alice and Bob, and for any photon-number distribution of their signals. It may be used,
for instance, with sources emitting phase-randomised weak coherent pulses, triggered spontaneous parametric down-
conversion sources, and also with practical single-photon sources. More precisely, we show that the estimation of
these parameters can be written as a linear program, which can be solved efficiently in polynomial time, and gives
the optimum even for large dimensions [43].
Let us introduce first some notations. In particular, let Nnm denote the number of signals sent by Alice and Bob
with n and m photons respectively, when they select the Z basis. And, let N =
∑
n,mNnm be the number of signals
sent in the Z basis. Using the Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality for i.i.d. random variables [34]-[58], we have that
Nnm = N(pnm|Z + δnm), (D1)
except with error probability γnm = εnm + εˆnm. The term pnm|Z is a parameter that characterises the sources. It
represents the conditional probability that Alice and Bob send a signal with n and m photons respectively, given that
they selected the basis Z. The parameter δnm lies in the interval [−∆nm, ∆ˆnm], with
∆nm = min
{
g(pnm|Z/N, εnm), pnm|Z
}
, (D2)
∆ˆnm = min
{
k(N, pnm|Z, εˆnm), 1− pnm|Z
}
. (D3)
Here, the function k(x, y, z) = ln (z−2)(1 +
√
1 + 4xy/ ln (z−2))/2x, and the second term on the r.h.s. of Eqs. (D2)-
(D3) is due to the fact that N ≥ Nnm ∀n,m. Also, we have that
∑
n,mN(pnm|Z + δnm) is by definition equal to N ,
i.e., the terms δnm satisfy
∑
n,m δnm = 0.
1. Estimation of nk,0
The procedure to calculate nk,0 is similar to that used in the analytical approach presented in Appendix C 1. First,
we obtain the parameter mk,0 and then we apply Eq. (C14).
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Next, we show that the search for mk,0 can be formulated as a linear program. To do so, however, we need to
reduce the number of unknown parameters Sk,nm and δnm to a finite set. For this, we first derive a lower and upper
bound for the quantities |Za,bk |.
In particular, since pa,b|nm,ZSk,nm ≥ 0 for all n,m, from Eq. (C3) we have that
|Za,bk | ≥
∑
n,m∈Scut
pa,b|nm,ZSk,nm + δa,b. (D4)
Here, Scut denotes a finite set of indexes n,m, which includes the case n = m = 1. For instance, one may select Scut =
{n,m ∈ N with n+m ≤ Mcut}, for a prefixed value Mcut ≥ 2. In this case, Scut has Ncut = (Mcut + 1)(Mcut + 2)/2
elements.
Similarly, we also have that∑
n,m/∈Scut
pa,b|nm,ZSk,nm ≤
∑
n,m/∈Scut
pa,b|nm,ZNnm ≤ max
kl/∈Scut
pa,b|kl,Z
∑
n,m/∈Scut
N
(
pnm|Z + δnm
)
= max
kl/∈Scut
pa,b|kl,Z N
[
1−
∑
n,m∈Scut
(pnm|Z + δnm)
]
. (D5)
In the first two inequalities of Eq. (D5) we use Nnm ≥ Sk,nm ≥ 0, together with Eq. (D1). The last equality uses∑
n,m/∈Scut pnm|Z = 1−
∑
n,m∈Scut pnm|Z and
∑
n,m/∈Scut δnm = −
∑
n,m∈Scut δnm. If we now combine Eqs. (C3)-(D5)
we obtain that
|Za,bk | ≤
∑
n,m∈Scut
pa,b|nm,ZSk,nm + max
kl/∈Scut
pa,b|kl,ZN
[
1−
∑
n,m∈Scut
(pnm|Z + δnm)
]
+ δa,b. (D6)
Moroever, using the Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality [34]-[58], it is straightforward to show that the term∑
n,m∈Scut δnm lies in the interval [−∆, ∆ˆ], with
∆ = min
{
g(pScut|Z/N, ε), pScut|Z
}
, (D7)
∆ˆ = min
{
k(N, pScut|Z, εˆ), 1− pScut|Z
}
, (D8)
except with error probability γ = ε+ εˆ, where pScut|Z =
∑
n,m∈Scut pnm|Z.
Based on the foregoing, we find that mk,0 can be calculated using the following linear program
min
Mcut∑
m=0
pas,bs|0m,ZSk,0m
s.t. |Za,bk | ≥
∑
n,m∈Scut
pa,b|nm,ZSk,nm + δa,b, ∀a, b
|Za,bk | ≤
∑
n,m∈Scut
pa,b|nm,ZSk,nm + max
kl/∈Scut
pa,b|kl,Z N
[
1−
∑
n,m∈Scut
(pnm|Z + δnm)
]
+ δa,b, ∀a, b
∑
a,b
δa,b = 0, ∆ˆa,b ≥ δa,b ≥ −∆a,b, ∀a, b
N
(
pnm|Z + δnm
) ≥ Sk,nm ≥ 0, ∀n,m ∈ Scut
∆ˆnm ≥ δnm ≥ −∆nm, ∀n,m ∈ Scut
∆ˆ ≥
∑
n,m∈Scut
δnm ≥ −∆. (D9)
The constraint
∑
a,b δa,b = 0 is due to the fact that
∑
a,b |Za,bk | is by definition equal to
∑
n,m Sk,nm.
The linear program given by Eq. (D9) has 2Ncut + (dA + 1)(dB + 1) unknown parameters Sk,nm, δnm and δa,b.
Here, dA (dB) denotes the number of decoy intensity settings used by Alice (Bob). The number of known elements
is (dA + 1)(dB + 1)Ncut + (dA + 1)(dB + 1) + 1 +Ncut. These are the terms pa,b|nm,Z, |Za,bk |, maxkl/∈Scut pa,b|kl,Z and
pnm|Z. Finally, given the tolerated failure probabilities εa,b, εˆa,b, εnm, εˆnm, ε and εˆ, the value of ∆ˆa,b, ∆a,b, ∆ˆnm,
∆nm, ∆ˆ and ∆ is also known.
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If we denote the solution to the optimisation problem given by Eq. (D9) as nsol, then from Eq. (C4) we have that
mk,0 = max
{⌊nsol − g(nsol, ε0)⌋, 0}, (D10)
except with error probability ε′k,0 given by
ε′k,0 ≤ ε0 + γ +
∑
a,b
γa,b +
∑
n,m∈Scut
γnm. (D11)
2. Estimation of nk,1
To obtain nk,1 we use again the same two-step technique introduced in Appendix C 2. That is, we first calculate
mk,1, and then we use Eq. (C30). To estimate mk,1, we first obtain a lower bound for Sk,11, and then we apply
Eq. (C16). In so doing, we reduce the problem of calculating nk,1 to that of finding a lower bound for Sk,11. This is
what we do below.
For this, we reuse the linear program given by Eq. (D9), only substituting its linear objective function with Sk,11.
If we denote the solution to this program as nsol, then from Eq. (C16) we have that
mk,1 = max
{⌊pas,bs|11,Znsol − g(pas,bs|11,Znsol, ε1)⌋, 0}, (D12)
except with error probability ε′k,1 given by
ε′k,1 ≤ ε1 + γ +
∑
a,b
γa,b +
∑
n,m∈Scut
γnm. (D13)
3. Estimation of ek,1
Again, to estimate ek,1 we follow the same steps introduced in Appendix C 3. That is, we calculate the parameters
n¯k,1 and e¯k,1, and then we apply Eq. (C32).
a. Estimation of n¯k,1
To obtain n¯k,1 we once more reuse the linear program given by Eq. (D9), only making the following three changes.
First, all the parameters now refer to the X basis rather than the Z basis. For example, Sk,nm will denote the
number of signals sent by Alice and Bob with n and m photons respectively, when they select the X basis and Charles
announces the Bell state k. And, likewise for the other parameters. Second, we substitute the probabilities pa,b|nm,Z
and pnm|Z with pa,b|nm,X and pnm|X respectively, and the sets Za,bk with X a,bk . Third, we replace the linear objective
function by Sk,11.
Then, if nsol denotes the solution to this program, we have that
n¯k,1 = max
{⌊nsol⌋, 0}, (D14)
except with error probability ε′k,e given by
ε′k,e ≤ γ +
∑
a,b
γa,b +
∑
n,m∈Scut
γnm. (D15)
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b. Estimation of e¯k,1
By using the same line of reasoning as in the previous sections, it is easy to show that e¯k,1 can be calculated with
the following linear program
max Ek,11
s.t. |Ea,bk | ≥
∑
n,m∈Scut
pa,b|nm,XEk,nm + δa,b, ∀a, b
|Ea,bk | ≤
∑
n,m∈Scut
pa,b|nm,XEk,nm + max
kl/∈Scut
pa,b|kl,X N
[
1−
∑
n,m∈Scut
(pnm|X + δnm)
]
+ δa,b, ∀a, b
∑
a,b
δa,b = 0, ∆ˆa,b ≥ δa,b ≥ −∆a,b, ∀a, b
N
(
pnm|X + δnm
) ≥ Ek,nm ≥ 0, ∀n,m ∈ Scut
∆ˆnm ≥ δnm ≥ −∆nm, ∀n,m ∈ Scut
∆ˆ ≥
∑
n,m∈Scut
δnm ≥ −∆, (D16)
where the definition of the different parameters is analogous to that of the previous sections, only substituting Za,bk
with Ea,bk , pnm|Z with pnm|X, pScut|Z with pScut|X, and N with the number of signals sent by Alice and Bob in the X
basis. If nsol denotes the solution to this program then
e¯k,1 = min{⌈nsol⌉, n¯k,1}, (D17)
except with error probability ε′′k,e given by
ε′′k,e ≤ γ +
∑
a,b
γa,b +
∑
n,m∈Scut
γnm. (D18)
Appendix E: Chernoff bound
Here we present the proof for Claim 1 introduced in Appendix B. Also, we demonstrate a generalised version of
it that can be applied when the conditions required in the Claim are not fulfilled. For simplicity, we divide this
section into three parts. First, we introduce and demonstrate Claim 2 below, which assumes that the mean value
µ is known. Second, we use this result to prove Claim 1, which considers that µ is unknown. Third, we present a
generalised version of Claim 1 (see Claim 3 below) that can be employed when (2ε−1)1/µL > exp
[
3/(4
√
2)
]2
and/or
(εˆ−1)1/µL ≥ exp (1/3).
Claim 2. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn, be a set of independent Bernoulli random variables that satisfy Pr(Xi = 1) = pi, and
let X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ = E[X ] =
∑n
i=1 pi, where E[·] denotes the mean value. Let x be the observed outcome of X
for a given trial (i.e., x ∈ N+). When (2ε−1)1/µ ≤ exp [3/(4√2)]2 and (εˆ−1)1/µ < exp (1/3) for certain ε, εˆ > 0, we
have that x satisfies
x = µ+ δ, (E1)
except with error probability γ = ε + εˆ, where the parameter δ ∈ [−∆, ∆ˆ], with ∆ = g(x, ε4/16), ∆ˆ = g(x, εˆ3/2) and
g(x, y) =
√
2x ln (y−1). Here ε (εˆ) denotes the probability that x < µ−∆ (x > µ+ ∆ˆ).
That is, Claim 2 implies that the observed outcome x of X for a given trial satisfies
µ+
√
2x ln (εˆ−3/2) ≥ x ≥ µ−
√
2x ln (16ε−4), (E2)
except with error probability γ = ε + εˆ, given that both (2ε−1)1/µ ≤ exp [3/(4√2)]2 and (εˆ−1)1/µ < exp (1/3). To
simplify the notation in the proof below, we will denote these last two conditions as C1 and C2, respectively.
Proof. Claim 2 can be equivalently written as
Pr
[
µ+
√
2X ln (εˆ−3/2) ≥ X ≥ µ−
√
2X ln (16ε−4)| C1 ∧ C2
] ≥ 1− ε− εˆ. (E3)
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To prove this statement, it is sufficient to show that
Pr
[
X − µ >
√
2X ln (εˆ−3/2) | C2
]
≤ εˆ, (E4)
Pr
[
µ−X >
√
2X ln (16ε−4) | C1
]
≤ ε. (E5)
Let us begin by demonstrating Eq. (E4). Our starting point is a multiplicative form of the Chernoff bound for
independent random variables[59–61]. In particular, we have that
Pr [X > (1 + ǫ)µ] ≤ e−µǫ
2
3 , (E6)
for 0 < ǫ < 1. This equation can be equivalently written as
Pr
[
X − µ >
√
2µ ln (ξ−3/2)
]
≤ ξ, (E7)
for (ξ−1)1/µ < exp (1/3). Now, to prove the first equation in Eq. (E4) we consider two cases: X ≤ µ and X > µ.
More precisely, we have that
Pr
[
X − µ >
√
2X ln (εˆ−3/2) ∧X ≤ µ | C2
]
= 0, (E8)
since both events are mutually exclusive. For the second case, we have that
Pr
[
X − µ >
√
2X ln (εˆ−3/2) ∧X > µ | C2
] ≤ Pr[X − µ >√2µ ln (εˆ−3/2) ∧X > µ | C2]
≤ Pr[X − µ >√2µ ln (εˆ−3/2) | C2] ≤ εˆ, (E9)
where in the first inequality we have used the fact that
√
2X ln (εˆ−3/2) >
√
2µ ln (εˆ−3/2) when X > µ, in the second
inequality we have used Pr[A ∧B|C] ≤ Pr[A|C], and in the last inequality we have used Eq. (E7).
Let us now prove Eq. (E5). Again, our starting point is a multiplicative form of the Chernoff bound for independent
random variables[59–61]. More precisely,
Pr [X < (1 − ǫ)µ] ≤ e−µǫ
2
2 , (E10)
with 0 < ǫ < 1. This statement can be rewritten as
Pr
[
µ−X >
√
2µ ln (2ξ−1)
]
≤ ξ/2, (E11)
for (2ξ−1)1/µ < exp (1/2). That is, Eq. (E11) is also valid when (2ξ−1)1/µ ≤ exp [3/(4√2)]2 since exp [3/(4√2)]2 <
exp (1/2). Now, we evaluate three cases: X ≥ µ, µ/k ≤ X < µ and X < µ/k with 4 ≥ k > 1. The first case
corresponds to
Pr
[
µ−X >
√
2X ln (16ε−4) ∧X ≥ µ | C1
]
= 0, (E12)
since both events are mutually exclusive. Let us now consider the second case, i.e.,
Pr
[
µ−X >
√
2X ln (16ε−4) ∧ µ/k ≤ X < µ | C1
]
≤ Pr
[
µ−X > 2√
k
√
2µ ln (2ε−1) ∧ µ/k ≤ X < µ | C1
]
≤ Pr
[
µ−X >
√
2µ ln (2ε−1) ∧ µ/k ≤ X < µ | C1
]
≤ Pr
[
µ−X >
√
2µ ln (2ε−1) | C1
]
≤ ε/2. (E13)
In the first inequality we have used the fact that X ≥ µ/k and ln (16ε−4) = 4 ln (2ε−1), in the second inequality we
have used 2/
√
k ≥ 1 when 4 ≥ k > 1, in the third inequality we have used again Pr[A ∧ B|C] ≤ Pr[A|C], and in the
last inequality we have used Eq. (E11). Let us now consider the third case, i.e.,
Pr
[
µ−X >
√
2X ln (16ε−4) ∧X < µ/k | C1
]
≤ Pr [X < µ/k | C1] = Pr[µ−X > χµ | C1] , (E14)
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with χ = (k − 1)/k. When (2ε−1)1/µ ≤ exp [(k − 1)/(√2k)]2 (i.e, when χµ ≥√2µ ln (2ε−1)) we have that
Pr
[
µ−X > χµ | (2ε−1)1/µ ≤ e[(k−1)/(
√
2k)]2
]
≤ Pr
[
µ−X >
√
2µ ln (2ε−1)| (2ε−1)1/µ ≤ e[(k−1)/(
√
2k)]2
]
≤ ε/2,
(E15)
where in the last inequality we have used Eq. (E11). That is, if we select k = 4, then from Eqs. (E14)-(E15) we have
that
Pr
[
µ−X >
√
2X ln (16ε−4) ∧X < µ/4 | C1
]
≤ ε/2. (E16)
Combining the results above we find that
Pr
[
µ−X >
√
2X ln (16ε−4) | C1
]
≤ ε.  (E17)
Next, we will use the Claim 2 above to prove the Claim 1 introduced in Appendix B. For this, we only need to
derive a lower bound for the mean value µ, which we will denote as µL, as a function of the observed outcome x of
X . This can be done using the Hoeffding inequality [58]. It states that
Pr [µ ≤ X − t] ≤ e− 2t
2
n , (E18)
for t > 0. This condition can be equivalently written as
Pr
[
µ ≤ X −
√
n/2 ln (1/ǫ)
]
≤ ǫ (E19)
That is, with probability 1− ǫ we have that
µ > µL = x−
√
n/2 ln (1/ǫ). (E20)
Then, if (2ε−1)1/µL ≤ exp [3/(4√2)]2 and (εˆ−1)1/µL < exp (1/3) we have that the conditions (2ε−1)1/µ ≤
exp
[
3/(4
√
2)
]2
and (εˆ−1)1/µ < exp (1/3) are also satisfied except with probability ǫ. This is so because (2ε−1)1/µ ≤
(2ε−1)1/µL and (εˆ−1)1/µ ≤ (εˆ−1)1/µL . If the random variable X satisfies the two conditions above, then from Claim
2 we have that any observed outcome x¯ of X can be written as x¯ = µ + δ, except with error probability γ = ε + εˆ,
where the parameter δ ∈ [−∆, ∆ˆ], with ∆ = g(x¯, ε4/16) and ∆ˆ = g(x¯, εˆ3/2). Since this result applies to any observed
outcome x¯ of X it applies, in particular, to the outcome x. This concludes the proof of Claim 1.
To finish this section, we introduce now a generalised version of Claim 1 (see Claim 3 below). It can be applied
when the conditions (2ε−1)1/µL ≤ exp [3/(4√2)]2 and/or (εˆ−1)1/µL < exp (1/3) are not fulfilled.
Claim 3. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn, be a set of independent Bernoulli random variables that satisfy Pr(Xi = 1) = pi, and
let X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ = E[X ] =
∑n
i=1 pi, where E[·] denotes the mean value. Let x be the observed outcome of X
for a given trial (i.e., x ∈ N+) and µL = x−
√
n/2 ln (1/ǫ) for certain ǫ > 0. Then, we have that x satisfies
x = µ+ δ, (E21)
except with error probability γ, where the parameter δ ∈ [−∆, ∆ˆ]. Let test1, test2 and test3 denote, respectively, the
following three conditions: (2ε−1)1/µL ≤ exp [3/(4√2)]2, (εˆ−1)1/µL < exp (1/3) and (εˆ−1)1/µL < exp [(2e− 1)/2]2 for
certain ε, εˆ > 0, and let g(x, y) =
√
2x ln (y−1). Now:
1. When test1 and test2 are fulfilled, we have that γ = ǫ+ ε+ εˆ, ∆ = g(x, ε
4/16) and ∆ˆ = g(x, εˆ3/2).
2. When test1 and test3 are fulfilled (and test2 is not fulfilled), we have that γ = ǫ + ε+ εˆ, ∆ = g(x, ε
4/16) and
∆ˆ = g(x, εˆ2).
3. When test1 is fulfilled and test3 is not fulfilled, we have that γ = ǫ + ε + εˆ, ∆ = g(x, ε
4/16) and ∆ˆ =√
(n/2) log (1/ε).
4. When test1 is not fulfilled and test2 is fulfilled, we have that γ = ǫ + ε + εˆ, ∆ =
√
(n/2) log (1/ε) and ∆ˆ =
g(x, εˆ3/2).
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5. When test1 and test2 are not fulfilled, and test3 is fulfilled, we have that γ = ǫ + ε+ εˆ, ∆ =
√
(n/2) log (1/ε)
and ∆ˆ = g(x, εˆ2).
6. When test1, test2 and test3 are not fulfilled, we have that γ = ε+ εˆ, ∆ = ∆ˆ =
√
(n/2) log (1/ε).
Proof. Item 1 is the Claim 1. The proof for item 2 is basically the same as that used to prove item 1, only
substituting Eq. (E6) by
Pr [X > (1 + ǫ)µ] ≤ e−µǫ
2
4 , (E22)
for 0 < ǫ < 2e− 1. For item 3 we combine the proof of item 1 for the lower tail with the Hoeffding inequality for the
upper tail [58]. Item 4 combines the proof of item 1 for the upper tail with the Hoeffding inequality for the lower tail.
Item 5 combines the proof of item 2 for the upper tail with the Hoeffding inequality for the lower tail. Finally, item
6 uses the Hoeffding inequality for both the upper and lower tails.
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